Abstract. We call a distribution on n{bit strings ("; e){locally random, if for every choice of e n positions the induced distribution on e{bit strings is in the L1{norm at most " away from the uniform distribution on e{bit strings. We establish local randomness in polynomial random number generators (RNG) that are candidate one{way functions. Let N be a squarefree integer and let f1; : : : ; f`be polynomials with coecients in ZZN = ZZ=NZZ. We study the RN G that stretches a random x 2 ZZN into the sequence of least signi cant bits of f1(x); : : : ; f`(x).
Introduction and Summary
A major open problem in cryptography is to establish one{way functions. While we cannot prove one{wayness it makes sense to analyse candidate one{way functions and to prove properties of these functions that are useful in cryptographic applications. We call a distribution on n{bit strings ("; e){locally random if for every choice of e n positions the induced distribution on e{bit strings is in the L 1 {norm at most " away from the uniform distribution on e{bit strings. We prove ("; e){local randomness for large classes of candidate one{way functions and candidate cryptographic hash functions.
We show that`{tuples of polynomials (f 1 ; : : :; f`) 2 ZZ N x]`with xed coecients in ZZ N and for arbitrary odd squarefree N provide local randomness if for every prime divisor p of N the polynomials f 1 ; : : :; f`are linearly independent modulo the subspace of polynomials of degree 1 in ZZ p x]. To give an example let N be prime N > 2 n , let f 1 ; : : :; f`2 ZZ N x] be any polynomials that are linearly independent modulo the subspace of polynomials of degree 1 in ZZ N x]. We prove in Corollary 2 that for random x 2 ZZ N the bit string (f 1 (x) 1; : : :; f`(x) 1) consisting of the parity bits f i (x) 1 of the residues f i (x) mod N in 0; N ? 1] is ("; e){locally random provided that "; n;`and e satisfy the inequality 2 ?n=2 (2n log 2) e+1 2` " ; (1) where log denotes the natural logarithm. E.g. we can choose n 64;`= b2 n=7 c; " = 2 ?n=7 ; e = bn=(7 log n)c. Our main result comprises the case that N is an arbitrary odd squarefree integer, that the output contains several bits from each of the residues f i (x) mod N, i = 1; : : :;`, and that x is chosen to be random in a subinterval 0; M ? 1] of 0; N ? 1] .
Note that the above function 0; N ? 1] 3 x 7 ! (f 1 (x) 1; : : :; f`(x) 1) (2) is a candidate one{way function. No inversion algorithm is known that is polynomial time in min(`; log 2 N). So far the one{wayness of the function (2) has only be proved for random RSA{moduli N and RSA{polynomials f i = x e i (see below) provided that the RSA{scheme is secure. It is however possible that this one{way function is more secure than the RSA{scheme. We are not aware of any inversion algorithm which for RSA{moduli N runs in time min (2` ; N) o (1) . On the other hand the RSA{scheme can be broken by factoring N using only exp( p log N log log N) many steps. Is there any inversion algorithm that uses knowledge of the factorization of RSA{numbers N ? Is there any inversion algorithm that uses the structure of particular odd moduli N and of particular non{constant polynomials f i ? Of course the function (2) can easily be inverted for N = 2 since f i (x) 1 only depends on x 1 = x mod 2. Also the problem of inverting is trivial for constant functions as f i (x) = x N?1 (modN) with N prime. Are there more exceptions? Almost nothing is known about the problem to invert (2) . However if we cannot even nd inverting algorithms for particular cases given the factorization of the modulus then this may be a sign that the function (2) is a truly one{way function.
It is important that the source of randomness in (f 1 (x) 1; : : :; f`(x) 1) is the random argument x while the coe cients of f 1 ; : : :; f`are all xed. Such functions are cryptographically interesting. A well known example is the random number generator (RNG) related to the RSA{scheme by Alexi, Chor, Goldreich and Schnorr (1988) and Micali, Schnorr (1991) . E.g. let N be the product of two large random primes and let the integer e 3 be relatively prime to '(N). Then the mapping 0; N ? 1] 3 x 7 ! (x e 1; x e 2 1; : : :; x` 1) where x e i is taken modulo N, is a perfect (in the sense of Yao (1982) and Blum, Micali (1982) ) RNG provided that the RSA{scheme is secure.
The functions x 7 ! (f 1 (x) 1; : : :; f`(x) 1) extend the class of polynomial random number generators (RNG) proposed by Micali and Schnorr (1991) which stretch a random seed x 2 1; N2 ?k ] into a polynomial residue P(x)(modN). Micali and Schnorr prove that the m least signi cant bits of P(x)(modN) are in the L 1 {norm at most O(N ?1=2 2 k+m (logN) 2 deg N (P)) away from the uniform distribution provided that N is prime and deg N (P) 2 where deg N (P) is the degree of P when P is considered modulo N.
So far local randomness has mainly been studied in functions that are easy to invert, see Alon, Babai, Itai (1986), Luby (1986) , Schnorr (1988) , Maurer, Massey (1989) , Naor, Naor (1990) , Nisan (1990) and Alon, Goldreich, Hastad, Peralta (1990) . Most of these constructions are methodically simple and are not directed towards cryptographic applications. They aim at minimizing the number of random bits that are used in randomised algorithms. Merely the quadratic character construction by Alon et alii (1990) is similar to our generator, it relies on Weil's theorem. Our proof of local randomness relies on upper bounds for exponential sums and an inequality on quantitative Fourier inversion. We use upper bounds for the discrepancy of polynomial residues from Niederreiter (1977) and we extend these bounds from prime moduli to arbitrary squarefree moduli.
We also establish random function generators, associated with xed polynomials, that provide local randomness. These generators are candidates for crypto- We call a function family fP z g ("; e){locally random if for random z and for any e distinct points y 1 ; : : :; y e the distribution of the em{bit string P z (y 1 ) P z (y e ) is in the L 1 {norm at most " away from the uniform distribution on em{bit strings.
We prove in Theorem 6 that the above family of functions fP m z g is ("; e){ locally random, if N is prime, d = deg P satis es e + 1 d < N and if N ?1=2 (logN) e+1 2 em+2 d ": A family of functions is an e{universal family of hash functions as introduced by Carter and Wegman (1979) if and only if it is (0; e){locally random. Our hash functions require fewer random bits than those of Carter and Wegman since we only randomize the input of the polynomial whereas Carter and Wegman randomize all its coe cients. The main point however is that our hash{functions are { if deg P is su ciently large { candidates for cryptographically secure hashing whereas the Carter{Wegman hash functions are easy to invert. Thus for the rst time we establish local randomness in families of cryptographic hash functions. The condition that F is N{admissible cannot be completely removed from Theorem 1. Theorem 1 does not hold for linear polynomials f 1 ; : : :; f`with` 2. This is because the least signi cant bits in two linear polynomials are highly correlated. On the other hand our proof shows that Theorem 1 holds for a single polynomial of degree 1 in the case that N = M. De nition. A probability distribution D on I n is called ("; e){locally random if for any sequence of positions 1 j 1 < j 2 < < j e n the substring (y j1 ; : : :; y je ) 2 I e of a D{random string y = (y 1 ; : : :; y n ) is statistically random within ".
Random
Using Theorem 1 we can stretch a short random seed into a long bit string that is \locally random". 
